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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF RECIDIVIST STATUTES
THAT CONTAIN MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
ANTHONY NA GORSKI
ABSTRACT
The goal of this article is to answer the question: Why have more states
not enacted habitual offender statutes after the initial legislative enactment
boom of these statutes in the 1990s? The focus of this article is on habitual
offender laws, most notably Three Strikes laws, which provide for
mandatory minimum sentences imposed upon a defendant after a certain
number of prior offenses have been committed. Focusing specifically on
Three Strikes laws limits the scope of this analysis regarding habitual
offender statutes because it leaves out arguments associated with the
discretionary decisions of judges and prosecutors within such statutes.
Repeat offender statutes that carry mandatory minimum sentences are
inherently unfair to defendants. Additionally, these laws are being
reevaluated in an effort to cut costs. The punishment a defendant serves
under a recidivist statute may be disproportionate to the actual offense
committed. These statutes also unfairly impose a punishment for a
defendant's prior offenses for which they have already been punished,
essentially punishing a defendant for his status as a "criminal." These
statutes create unfair penalties for defendants, fail to deter criminals,
overcrowd prisons, and lack any traditional criminal justice rationale for
their existence. Such statutes are an ineffective way to deter crime and they
impose sentences that are unfair to defendants.
I INTRODUCTION
Recidivist statutes, also termed habitual offender laws, significantly
increase the prison sentences handed down to persons convicted of a violent
crime or serious felony. In fact, these statutes require that those offenders be
given a prison sentence of a significant number of years (usually twenty-
five years to life), rather than a lesser punishment possible in sentencing
circumstances where a Three Strikes statute is not considered. This paper
J.D. Candidate 2011, University of St. Thomas School of Law; Symposium Director, Journal of
Law and Public Policy.
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focuses only on those habitual offender laws that require a mandatory
minimum sentence. Any reference to habitual offender statutes, or Three
Strikes laws, in this paper applies only to those statutes which contain
mandatory minimum sentences. Focusing solely on this specific type of
habitual offender law limits the scope of the analysis and leaves out any
arguments related to discretionary decisions made with regard to recidivist
laws. Three Strikes laws are statutes "prescribing an enhanced sentence,
esp[ecially] life imprisonment, for a repeat offender's third felony
conviction."' These statutes have been called into enactment by state and
federal legislatures in an attempt to answer the question: "How do we deal
with those individuals who refuse to be rehabilitated and deterred from
committing future crimes?"'
Economic theory holds that, all else equal, a person is less likely to
commit a crime when the expected costs for committing that crime
increase.3 The additional prison terms called for by recidivist laws increase
the expected costs for persons who commit new crimes subsequent to a
prior conviction for a crime defined within the statute. These laws were
especially tempting to enact given the repeated statistic that six percent of
criminal offenders commit nearly seventy percent of all crimes, and six
percent of violent offenders commit seventy percent of all violent crimes.4
It would seem logical that enacting a law which both deters new criminals
and keeps repeat violent offenders locked up for longer periods of time
would decrease the overall crime rates. It was precisely this logic that
helped recidivist laws increase in popularity in the 1990s. In 1999, twenty-
six states and the federal government had enacted laws that were considered
Three Strikes laws in an attempt to fird a way to decrease skyrocketing
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
2. Daniel Lungren, Letter to the Editor, Financial Costs of "3 Strikes Law," L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1996, at B8 (stating claim by California Attorney General Daniel Lungren that the state's
Three Strikes law is "having an immediate impact on the 7% of all criminals who commit between
50% and 70% of all crimes"); see also Bill Jones, Impact of "Three Strikes" Draws Praise,
Criticism: Pro Evidence Shows Law is Working, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 21, 1996, at B7 (reporting that
California Secretary of State who co-sponsored the Three Strikes law stated that 6% of criminals
are responsible for 70% of the state's crime); cf, Mario M. Cuomo, "Three Strikes, " Two Views:
Harsh, Sure, But Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at A19 (stating that a Three Strikes law "would
give us a heavy hammer to use against these career criminals"); Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law
Shows It's Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at Al (describing claims by
proponents that Washington's Three Strikes law will remove from society a core group of
incorrigible violent criminals).
3. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973).
4. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998); see e.g., Cuomo, supra
note 2 (stating that studies have indicated that 15% of offenders are responsible for 85% of
personal injury offenses); and Egan, supra note 2 (noting claim by supporters of Washington
state's Three Strikes law that federal statistics show 6% of criminals commit 70% of crimes).
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crime rates.5 Today, twenty-four states still have Three Strikes laws, but
many are continuing to search for ways to decrease prison costs and are
offering clemency to individuals previously sentenced to life in prison for
nonviolent crimes under recidivist statutes.6
The United States Supreme Court held that various repeat offender
statutes are constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, and has rarely
overturned a sentence under a Three Strikes law. However, nearly half of
the states have yet to pass a Three Strikes statute, and many have amended
current recidivist statutes to make them less severe. Also, no new state has
passed a Three Strikes law since 1995.1 Recidivist statutes containing
mandatory minimum sentences are unjust because they impose a
punishment for a defendant's prior offenses. For this reason, the
punishment a defendant serves under a recidivist statute is often grossly
disproportionate to the actual offense the defendant committed. These
statutes are unjust to a defendant because they punish the defendant based
on his status as a repeat criminal and not based on his commission of a new
crime. Three Strikes laws not only impose unfair penalties upon defendants,
but they also fail to deter criminals, overcrowd prisons, and lack traditional
criminal justice rationale for their existence.
II. OVERVIEW OF NOTABLE AND CURRENT RECIDIVIST STATUTES
The United States codified its career offender statute in 18 U.S.C.A.
§4B 1.1, which reads:
(a) A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a
felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.8
This statute was enacted in November of 1987 with multiple
amendments made to it throughout the 1990s; the most current amendment
passed as recently as 2002.' The statute requires that a defendant's third
conviction be a crime of violence or a controlled substance crime.10 It also
requires that the defendant have at least two prior felony convictions for
5. Mike Reynolds, States with Three Strikes Laws, Three Strikes and You're Out: Stop
Repeat Offenders, http://www.threestrikes.org/3strikestates.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
6. Matt Kelly, Revisiting Three-Strikes Laws, CHANGE.ORG, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://criminaljustice.change.org/blog/view/revisitingthree-strikeslaws.
7. See supra note 5.
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4B1.1 (West 2007).
9. Id. (see Historical Notes).
10. Id.
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either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense in order to be
sentenced as a career offender."
The federal career offender law punishes fewer individuals each year
and is less severe in its punishments than California's Three Strikes laws, as
is illustrated below. However, it is important to note that the federal
government of the United States has taken a position in support of repeat
offender laws.
Between December 1993 and January 1996, twenty-four states enacted
some version of the Three Strikes law.'" The original Three Strikes law,
passed in the state of Washington, ordered that individuals "who are
convicted of the 'most serious offenses' on three occasions be sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole."' 3 Other states soon followed by enacting
similar versions of the Washington law. The most notable state recidivist
statute that followed is California's Three Strikes law, which the legislature
passed in 1994.1'
California's Three Strikes law is significant due to the large size of the
California penal system. California's Three Strikes statute is unlike other
mandatory sentencing laws because it waits for the full three strikes before
requiring a mandatory sentence and increases the mandatory minimum for
an offense after one prior strike. 5 California's habitual offender law is
codified as California Penal Code § 667 and reads:
(a)(1) In compliance with subdivision (b) of Section 1385, any
person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been
convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense
committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements
of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence
imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year
enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and
tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each
enhancement shall run consecutively.
(e) For purposes of subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, and in addition
to any other enhancement or punishment provisions which may
apply, the following shall apply where a defendant has a prior
felony conviction:
(1) If a defendant has one prior felony conviction that has been
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4B1.2 (West 2007).
12. Reynolds, supra note 5.
13. Persistent Offender Accountability Act, ch. I, 1999 Wash. Legis. Serv. I.M. 593 (West).
14. The Three Strikes and You're Out Law, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE (Feb. 22,
1995), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1995/3strikes.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2010).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1994).
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pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an
indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided
as punishment for the current felony conviction.
(2)(A) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions
as defined in subdivision (d) that have been pled and proved,
the term for the current felony conviction shall be an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of:
(i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment
for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or
more prior felony convictions.
(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.' 6
Under California's Three Strikes law, a prior conviction counts as a
strike if it was for a serious or violent felony."7 If a defendant is convicted
of any felony and he has two or more "strike" priors (prior convictions for
what are now codified as strike offenses including convictions prior to the
enactment of the Three Strikes law in 1994), he must be sentenced to at
least twenty-five years to life in state prison. It is noteworthy that strikes are
counted by individual charges, rather than individual cases. Under
California's law, a judge has discretion to dismiss one or more strikes.'" In
deciding whether to dismiss a strike, "the court must consider whether, in
the light of the nature and circumstances of his or her present felonies and
prior serious or violent felony convictions and the particulars of his or her
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the three-strikes law's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he or she had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious or violent felonies."' 9 However, this has not stopped
individuals from being punished to controversially long sentences.
Defendants have been given sentences of twenty-five years to life in prison
for such crimes as shoplifting golf clubs,20 videotapes, 2' and pizza. 22
16. Id.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West 1994) ("Serious felonies" are listed in CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1192.7(c), and "violent felonies" are listed in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c).).
18. People v. Burgos, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1209 (2003); People v. Snow, 105 Cal. App. 4th 271
(2003); People v. Thimmes, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1207 (2006).
19. Burgos, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 1215 (citing People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161
(1998)).
20. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (Defendant had previous strikes for burglary and
robbery with a knife.).
21. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (Leandro Andrade received a double sentence of
25 years to life for two counts of shoplifting.).
22. People v. Williams, No. B091907 (Jerry Dewayne Williams had four previous non-
violent felonies and had his sentence later was reduced to six years.).
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III. INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF
RECIDIVIST STATUTES
A defendant's prior criminal history should be taken into account by the
sentencing judge when determining the length and method of sentence for a
new offense. Sentencing Guideline grids use two factors in evaluating a
defendant's sentence: past criminal history and the severity of the offense.
A defendant's past criminal history is viewed by some as an indicator of
whether the defendant is likely to commit another offense in the future and
is therefore a valuable consideration when applying the federal sentencing
guidelines. However the legislature, although given the power to set a
defendant's sentencing length, is not in a position to understand each
defendant's factual situation. Statutes with mandatory minimum sentences
result in punishments which are disproportionate to the crimes committed,
impose sentences for offenses where a punishment was already given, and
punish defendants solely for their criminal status.
A. PUNISHMENT MAY BE DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE
OFFENSE COMMITTED
Applying a mandatory minimum sentence creates a possible situation in
which a defendant could serve a sentence that would be disproportionate to
the crime committed. Drawing a bright-line rule that defendants be
sentenced to a set mandatory minimum takes the judge's factual
considerations out of the equation. Taking factual consideration away from
a judge during sentencing creates situations in which defendants are not
only punished for their prior offenses, but also given a sentence that is
disproportionate to the offense they committed.
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence without
the possibility of parole for a felony fraud crime involving approximately
$120.23 The ruling upheld a Texas recidivist law that required a minimum
punishment for a third felony offense committed within a fifteen year time
span to be life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.24 On his third
offense, the defendant refused to return money received as payment for
unsatisfactory repairs of an air conditioning unit. All three of the
defendant's crimes were felony fraud, totaling $230.25
The Supreme Court overturned Rummel v. Estelle, although only for a
short period, with Solem v. Helm. n Solem, the Court noted that the judicial
system should give substantial deference to the broad authority that the
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legislatures possess in determining the limits of punishments.26 The
Supreme Court further held the final clause of the Eighth Amendment
"prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed."27 The opinion called for
exceptions to the statutes, protecting the constitutional freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment, and declined to reject the statutes altogether. The
Solem Court used the principle of proportionality and decided that the
punishment handed down to a defendant should be proportionate to the
present crime.28 This principle has been recognized throughout U.S.
history. 9 The Court explained that a state is justified in punishing a
recidivist more severely than it punishes a first time offender and that prior
convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision." Conversely, the Court
continued that they "must focus on the principle felony-the felony that
triggers the life sentence-since [the defendant] has paid the penalty for
each of his prior offenses."'"
The Supreme Court used a three-factor test in Solem v. Helm. That test
reasoned that a particular punishment was unconstitutionally
disproportionate if (1) the crime was relatively minor in comparison to the
punishment; (2) the sentence imposed in the jurisdiction for similarly grave
offenses was less; and (3) other jurisdictions impose a lesser sentence for
the same crime.32
The Supreme Court's five to four holding in Solem was followed
shortly thereafter by Harmelin v. Michigan. The Harmelin Court concluded
that the mandatory life without parole sentence required by Michigan law,33
forbidding the possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine, was not cruel
and unusual punishment. 34 The majority wrote, "Severe, mandatory
penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense,
having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history."35
The language of the opinion refrained from striking down state statutes
setting minimum sentencing guidelines for recidivism, and only called for
exceptions to the statutes protecting the constitutional freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin, it is unclear
whether Solem's three-part proportionality test is still relevant in noncapital
26. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
27. Id. at 284.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 284-86.
30. Id. at 296-97.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 308-09.
33. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1990-91).
34. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, at 960 (1991).
35. Id. at 994-95.
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cases.36 The Harmelin Court issued three separate, and somewhat
conflicting, opinions discussing the scope of the Eighth Amendment's
proportionality guarantee. These opinions ranged from repudiation of Solem
by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist; to recognition of a "narrow"
proportionality doctrine by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter; to an
approval of Solem by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall.37
Despite the conflicting opinions, the continuing applicability of the Solem
test is indicated by the fact that a majority of the Harmelin Court either
expressly declined to overrule Solem or explicitly approved of Solem.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Harmelin, voiced his
disagreement with the three-part test in the Solem majority opinion. Scalia
argued that the Solem test presented difficulties in assessing the gravity of a
particular crime, and thus it would be difficult to determine whether
similarly grave crimes carried a lesser sentence.38 As for the part of the test
which determined whether other jurisdictions imposed a lesser sentence for
the same crime, Scalia conceded that this is easily figured out, but that this
inquiry has "no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment."39
However, Scalia's majority opinion in Harmelin never expressly overruled
the Solem test.
Justice White, disagreeing with Justice Scalia regarding the Solem test,
stated, "[T]he Solem analysis has worked well in practice."4 Justice White
argues that courts appear to have had little difficulty applying the analysis
to a given sentence and the application of the test by numerous state and
federal appellate courts has resulted in a mere handful of sentences being
declared unconstitutional.4' "Thus, it is clear that reviewing courts have not
baldly substituted their own subjective moral values for those of the
legislature."4  Justice White further emphasizes that courts have
demonstrated they are "capable of applying the Eighth Amendment to
disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to
principles of federalism and state autonomy."43 "Solem is wholly consistent
with this approach, and when properly applied, its analysis affords
'substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
36. See United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 408 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The effect of Harmelin
on the Solem proportionality factors is not entirely clear."); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d
1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Hannelin provides no guidance in articulating the proper approach
for an Eighth Amendment review."); United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994)
("[Tihe holding of Solem has been put into doubt by Harmelin v. Michigan.").
37. United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 723 (3d Cir. 1993).
38. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988.
39. Id. at 989.
40. Id. at 1016.
41. Id. at 1015.
42. Id. at 1015-16.
43. Harmelin, 501 U.S at 1016 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. 263, at 306 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
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possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as
well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted
criminals .... 44 The fact that this is one of those rare instances is no
reason to abandon the analysis.
More recently, the Supreme Court decided Ewing v. California and
Lockyer v. Andrade.5 In earlier decisions, the Court developed the "gross
disproportionality" principle, explaining that the principle involved a
"comparative analysis of sentences after determining that the sentence
imposed was grossly excessive punishment for the crime committed. 46
However, the Court's prior cases lack clarity regarding what factors may
indicate gross disproportionality and should be applicable only in the
"exceedingly rare" and "extreme" cases.47
In Ewing, Justice O'Conner wrote, "These laws responded to
widespread public concerns about crime by targeting the class of offenders
who pose the greatest threat to public safety: career criminals."48 She
reasoned that Three Strikes laws were a "deliberate policy choice" by
legislatures to set apart those who have "repeatedly engaged in serious or
violent criminal behavior" from the rest of society in order to protect public
safety.49 O'Conner argued that such laws serve the valid penological goals
of incapacitation and deterrence, and that, although controversial, the court
does not act "as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess" the policy choices
made by the states.5"
O'Conner wrote:
It is enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons
"advance the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial
way."51. . . In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must
place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long
history of felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to
accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find
expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions.52
Although Ewing's sentence was lengthy, the Court argued that it "reflected
a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who
have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit
44. Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. 277, at 290).
45. Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
46. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 298-300).
47. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 64.
48. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 28.
51. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.22).
52. Id. at 29.
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felonies must be incapacitated."53 The Court thus reasoned that Ewing's
twenty-five years to life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.54
In Lockyer, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a] gross
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.""
Because the Court was previously vague about which factors demonstrate
gross disproportionality, the rule is unclear, and, as such, has only been
applied to "exceedingly rare" and "extreme" cases. 6 In Solem, the sentence
did not include the possibility of parole, and the Court held it was cruel and
unusual. 7 In Rummel, the sentence allowed for parole, and the Court held it
was not cruel and unusual. 8 In Lockyer, like in Rummel, the defendant
retained the possibility for parole. When using the gross disproportionality
principle, courts will only overturn extremely disproportionate sentences; as
such, the Court in Lockyer concluded that the California courts did not
unreasonably apply the principle to the defendant's sentence. 9 After
Lockyer and Ewing, the Supreme Court essentially closed the door on
arguments that non-capital sentences in recidivist laws were disproportional
to the instant crime committed.
Partly because of the gross disproportionality theory, prosecutors and
judges alike have been cautious to apply mandatory minimum sentences.
The Supreme Court has now consistently held that increased sentences
under repeat offender statutes are not cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. Still, many judges and prosecutors have been
reluctant to sentence individuals under mandatory sentence laws because of
the gross disproportionality in sentence that would result.
A defendant's prior criminal history should be taken into account by the
sentencing judge when determining length and method of sentence for a
new offense.6" The legislature, though given the power to set defendants'
sentencing lengths in statute, is not in a position to see and understand each
particular defendant's given factual situation, including prior history, and
make a decision regarding the length of sentencing in repeat offender
situations. In United States v. Hughes, the Court stated that career offender
provisions do not "violate the eighth amendment by 'mechanically'
aggregating disparate offenses without regard to the seriousness of the
offenses or adequately considering the defendant's personal
characteristics," basing its judgment on the fact that the "sentencing judge
retains discretion to depart downward from the [career offender
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id.
55. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267).
59. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77.
60. See also, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.10 (Consol. 2010).
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provisions]."'"
One might argue that because many statutes contain a provision to
enhance punishment due to a defendant's prior similar offenses, therefore
judges and prosecutors may use their discretion when charging and
sentencing individuals under these statutes. However, the burden for a
sentencing judge to make a downward departure is very high and requires a
number of different circumstances.62 In federal court,
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described.63
In cases involving Three Strikes laws, this increased difficulty in obtaining
a downward departure often results in a sentence that is disproportionate to
the current offense.
Also, individual statutes that create elevated levels of offenses within
themselves are distinguishable from the mandatory repeat offender statutes.
This is because the individual enhancements are more restricted regarding
who is affected and are based on specific instances of repeat conduct (i.e.,
drug crimes and driving while under the influence crimes).
The Supreme Court has demonstrated its reluctance to hold that a given
sentence is disproportionate to the offense committed. However, it is hard
to ignore the fact that defendants are being given sentences undoubtedly
higher than would otherwise be given due to their prior criminal history.
This brings up the following issue: if defendants are not being given
excessive sentences for new crimes, are they being sentenced for their past
crimes again, in addition to the new crime, in order to justify the increased
length in sentences?
B. REPEAT OFFENDER STATUTES IMPOSE A PUNISHMENT
FOR A DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES
Defendants have attempted to convince the Supreme Court that repeat
offender statutes constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment because they impose an additional punishment on offenses for
which the defendant has already been punished. The Supreme Court
disagrees. In McDonald v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Court
held that repeat offender statutes are valid because they impose a heavy
61. United States v. Hughes, 901 F.2d 830, at 832(10th Cir. 1990).
62. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
Act (PROTECT Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006).
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penalty upon conviction of a felony committed by one who had been
convicted of two prior felonies.' 4 Thus, the court reasoned that the statutes
do not impose an additional punishment on crimes for which the defendant
has already been punished.65 In Cooper v. United States, the Federal Court
for the District of New York affirmed Congress' power to punish repeat
offenders more severely than new offenders.66 The court stated that
Congress violated no constitutional mandate when it provided that those
who have previously offended would be treated more severely should they
offend again.67
Often, a defendant's previous sentence was either negotiated in a plea
bargain or negotiated within a sentencing hearing. Frequently, defendants
plead guilty to crimes they would have fought in court had they known a
harsher penalty would be invoked. When these crimes are brought up under
a repeat offender statute and are sentenced according to recidivist statutes, it
raises concerns regarding the integrity of plea bargaining.
C. REPEAT OFFENDER LAWS PUNISH A DEFENDANT DUE TO
THEIR STA TUS AS A REPEAT CRIMINAL
Many defendants have attempted to make the argument that they are not
being punished for a new crime when sentenced under a repeat offender
law, and instead are being sentenced for their status as a career criminal.
Defendants argue that because this statute does not create a new crime, their
sentences under this statute constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. In 1962, the Supreme Court supported this position
when it held a recidivist statute unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment in Robinson v. California.68 The Court reasoned that the
sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it provided
punishment for the defendant's "status" as a recidivist and not as
punishment for the commission of a criminal act. 69 Applying this reasoning,
the prosecutor should charge the defendant with a specific crime and
provide him with a higher sentence rather than charge him as a career
criminal due to his repeat criminal offenses. However, such rationale has
not been successful in recent times, as illustrated below.
Since 1962, numerous defendants have attempted to make a similar
argument using the ruling in Robinson and have failed. Federal courts have
responded by stating that habitual offender laws merely make the
punishment more severe after conviction and that defendants are being
64. McDonald v. Commonwealth of Mass., 180 U.S. 311 (1901).
65. Id.
66. Cooper v. United States, 114 F. Supp 464 (D.N.Y. 1953).
67. Id.
68. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
69. Id.
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punished for a commission of a crime and not due to any particular status.
70
Courts have held that a third "strike" is a recent overt criminal act which
distinguishes the situation from one in which the defendant is punished
merely because of his status as a repeat offender.7'
However, this conclusion does not solve the problem of punishing a
repeat offender more harshly than a first time offender who committed the
exact same offense. It is not disputed that a defendant who has prior
criminal offenses may receive a higher punishment. Nevertheless, this
circles back to my argument that a judge or prosecutor is in a much better
position to lay down an appropriate punishment. Further, Three Strikes laws
are not the best deterrence method. Courts are struggling to fight the variety
of attacks being launched at Three Strikes laws by defense attorneys and
politicians alike. These arguments are unlikely to disappear because
politicians continue to seek ways to decrease crime rates and serve justice at
the same time.
D. RECIDIVIST STATUTES LACK EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE
EFFECTIVE AND COSTWORTHY
One thing proponents and opponents of Three Strikes laws agree on is
that crime rates across the nation have declined since repeat offender laws
began to be passed in the United States. Proponents of recidivist statutes
continuously credit Three Strikes laws for the decline. However, there is
plenty of evidence that conflicts with this assertion and brings into question
the true reason for lower crime rates within the United States. There is also
plenty of evidence that Three Strikes laws are expensive for taxpayers and
have not shown any concrete results proving their actual effectiveness.
California's Three Strikes law has been widely credited for the
significant drop in California's crime rate, while the population has
increased since its enactment in 1994. California had 345,624 incidents of
violent crime in 1992 and 336,381 in 1993. By 2000, the rate had dropped
to 210,531 incidents.73 Comparatively, in Minnesota, a state without a
recidivist statute and with a projected growth rate of five percent, crime
rates have dropped by a rate far greater than in California, a state with only
a 1.1 percent population growth rate.74 This information could be purely
coincidental, but the fact remains that states across the country have
70. See Sanchez v. Nelson, 446 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Hendrick, 217 N.W.2d
112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Gonzales v. New Mexico, 502 P.2d 300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
71. Martin v. Parratt, 412 F. Supp. 544 (D. Neb. 1976).
72. The Disaster Ctr., California Crime Rates 1960-2009, http://www.disastercenter.com/
crime/cacrime.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010).
73. Id.
74. The Disaster Ctr., Minnesota Crime Rates 1960-2009, http://www.disastercenter.com/
crime/mncrime.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
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experienced decreases in crime rates, dropping some rates to historically
low levels. In 1998, California Attorney General, Dan Lungren, published a
report attributing the dramatic decrease in crime in California over the
previous four years to the enactment of California's Three Strikes law.75
However, researchers, Lisa Stolzenberg and Stuart J. D'Alessio,
contradicted the Attorney General's statement by conducting a study and
concluding that the decrease in the crime rate was due to pre-existing trends
of falling crime rates that began before the laws ever went into effect. 76
Moreover, the lower rates could be attributed to the enactment of any
number of new criminal statutes or deterrence methods, not necessarily due
to the Three Strikes laws. However, given the exorbitant number of factors
that play into crime levels, both supporters and opponents of mandatory
minimum recidivist statutes will continue to argue over the cause of
decreasing crime rates.
Three Strikes laws have also received criticism for their lack of
consistency, especially given that one goal of mandatory sentences is
uniformity in sentencing. Three Strikes laws aim for uniformity by taking
out the element of discretion for prosecutors and judges in sentencing
decisions. However, much of the inconsistency occurs between the states'
varying uses of Three Strikes laws." Part of the problem is the reluctance of
prosecutors to charge, and judges to sentence, defendants under a Three
Strikes-type law. Thus, although these laws are written to be consistent for
all defendants with three or more "strikes," often they are not applied to all
defendants who have three "strikes." This results in inconsistency within
the application of these laws.
Criminals who are on their final strike may be desparate and more
likely to attack police because "the three-strikes penalties approach the
penalties for homicide and there is little marginal deterrence to dissuade a
criminal from murdering police if doing so reduces the probability of
arrest."78 The possibility has been suggested by numerous individuals and
some empirical studies have been testing the theory.79 While the Moody,
Marvell, & Kaminski study was not able to reach a conclusion on the issue,
it remains a reasonable concern that criminals may be more desperate and
willing to kill if on their third strike.
Repeat offender laws are financially burdensome on our penal systems
75. JENNIFER E. WALSH, THREE STRIKES LAWS 132-33 (Historical Guides to Controversial
Issues in America Series No. 5, 2007).
76. Id.
77. "3-Strikes" Usage Inconsistent, READING EAGLE, Sept. 10, 1996, at A4,
http://news.google.com/newspapersnid=1 955&dat=-19960910&id=IGQIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=n6YF
AAAAIBAJ&pg-4035,6370550.
78. CARLISLE E. MOODY, THOMAS B. MARVELL & ROBERT J. KAmINSKI, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES: THREE-STRIKES LAWS AND THE MURDERS OF POLICE OFFICERS 4 (2002).
79. Id.
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and create undue expense to taxpayers in order to house the increased
number of criminals who are being sentenced to prison terms, and for
longer periods of time. In California, "it is estimated that the Three-Strikes
law will cost $5.5 billion over a 20-year period."80 The cost of
implementation is expected to rise at least until 2019 when the first wave of
third-strike offenders are released. 81 At that time, other costs, such as the
increased amount of parole supervisions, will likely be incurred. The cost of
parole supervision for California inmates alone is estimated at about $20
million per year.82 In addition, the average prison population will rise, up to
an estimated 19.8% by 2020 in California, due to Three Strikes laws and the
longer sentences that come with them. With the average age increase comes
increased health care costs and training costs for new specialized personnel
in order to care for the aging population.83 These are clearly all expenses
that create a greater burden on taxpayers, but there are also expenses for the
prisoners who are being convicted of Three Strikes laws. Crowded prisons
lead to poorer living conditions, poorer prison services for inmates, and
increased violence between prison inmates.84 This increased violence could
be due to any number of reasons, including increased prisoner stress levels
and a lack of supervision due to overcrowding and state cost-cutting
methods which reduce the number of supervisors per prisoner ratio.
California was recently ordered by federal judges to cut its prison
population by more than 40,000 within the next two years.85 Furthermore,
the overcrowded system is unable to provide inmates with adequate medical
care and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger offered a controversial proposal
of shipping some inmates to out-of-state facilities as a cost-cutting
measure.
86
Supreme Court Justice Kennedy has spoken recently against Three
Strikes laws, specifically the California Three Strikes law. Justice Kennedy
used a speaking engagement at Pepperdine Law School to express his
dissatisfaction with the passing and use of Three Strikes laws in California.
Justice Kennedy disapproved of how the Three Strikes law imposes a
sentence for 25 years to life if a defendant commits a third felony, even if
80. Albert Dichiara, Costs Exceed Benefits of Three-Strikes Laws, HARTFORD BUS. J., (Feb.
4, 2008), available at http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/documents/pfisonerre-entry/
hbj_020408.asp.
81. Id.
82. David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest, Three Strikes as Public Policy: Future Implications,
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY 271 (David Shichor & Dale
K. Sechrest eds., 1996).
83. Id.
84. See M. G. Turner, J. L. Sundt, B. K. Applegate & F. Cullen, "Three Strikes and You're
Out" Legislation: A National Assessment, 59 FEDERAL PROBATION 16 (1995).
85. Coleman/ Plata v. Schwarzenegger, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 2430820 at
183 (E.D.Cal. 2009).
86. California Governor's Proclamation 4278 at 6.
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the felony is nonviolent.87 Justice Kennedy noted that sentences in the
United States are eight times longer than those in Europe.88 He also told
students to be aware that California has 185,000 people in prison at a cost
of $32,500 each per year.89 "He urged voters and elected officials to
compare taxpayer spending on prisons with spending on elementary
education."9 Justice Kennedy also stated his disapproval that the law's
sponsor was the correctional officers' union, calling this realization
"sick." 91
Given the lack of evidence proving that these statutes are indeed
effective, it is not surprising that states and the federal government are
continuing to search for ways to decrease the cost of repeat offender laws
and amend them to become less broad. Courts are also continuously
changing how Three Strikes laws are interpreted with their holdings. The
future will continue to be full of change as both the courts and legislature
continue to wrestle with these laws.
IV THE FUTURE OF RECIDIVIST STATUTES WITH MANDA TORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES
Due to the number of states struggling with budget deficits in recent
years,
[w]hen lawmakers consider adopting a three-strikes law, they
should evaluate whether other forms of sentencing frameworks and
correctional and operational polices can achieve the same level of
benefit with lower costs and less impact on vulnerable populations
most likely to suffer in the operation of large impersonal
bureaucracies.92
No longer are quick fix legislative actions being considered as serious
solutions to increasing crime rates without intensive studies into their
effectiveness, as well as extensive planning for the process by which a three
strikes law would be enacted.
No U.S. state has passed a new recidivist statute in recent years. Even
more interesting is the fact that numerous states have amended their current
repeat offender statutes to make them more lenient. This is undoubtedly due
to a lack of confidence in three strikes laws as a way to reduce and deter
crime in an economically responsible way. The laws have been used against
fewer violent offenders than originally thought and courts are becoming
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clogged with these cases, driving out less severe and civil cases.93
V CONCLUSION
Recidivist statutes with mandatory minimum punishments and Three
Strikes laws are unfair to defendants for three main reasons. First, these
laws impose punishment for defendants' prior offenses, for which they have
already been punished. Second, the punishment a defendant serves under a
recidivist statute is often disproportionate to the actual offense committed.
Lastly, these statutes punish defendants due to their criminal status. The
courts continue to wrestle with these arguments and to draw lines that are
fair for defendants while also serving the best interests of justice.
These statutes not only impose unfair penalties upon defendants, but
more importantly, they fail to deter criminals, overcrowd prisons, and lack
any traditional criminal justice rationale for their existence. These are all
serious problems which increase the burden on both the taxpayers and the
prisoners themselves. In these difficult financial times, it is no longer an
option to consider only the impact such statutes will have upon a state's
crime rate without balancing that impact against the costs to taxpayers.
Three Strikes laws are no longer a quick legislative deterrence method for
dealing with increasing crime rates. The effectiveness of these laws and the
processes by which they operate will further be questioned as lawmakers
continue to search for new legislative solutions to further decrease crime
rates in their state and across the country.
Due to the continued debate regarding the effectiveness of Three
Strikes laws, and recidivist statutes in general, I recommend that lawmakers
carefully reconsider recidivist statutes with mandatory minimum sentences
and the costs they impose upon criminal defendants and taxpayers who
carry the heavy burden of prison costs. Numerous criminal statutes can be
written to contain enhancements in order to further deter criminals from
committing the same crimes. Policy makers must also consider the costs of
imprisoning repeat offenders and seek a solution that rehabilitates criminals
and keeps prison populations from increasing at their current rates. This
debate is likely to continue. Therefore, it is critical to consider the harmful
effects such statutes have had on the United States in such a short time
period.
93. Shichor & Sechrest, supra note 82, at 273.
